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Some Aspects of Hungarian-Ukrainian Relations
in OurTime*
Csilla Fedinec
After a referendum confirming Ukraine's independence was held on
December 1, 1991, Hungary was one of the first foreign countries to recog-
nize Ukraine as an independent state, whereby an important consideration
was to assist in strengthening the position of the Hungarian minority in the
country. The Hungarian-Ukrainian Basic Treaty was the first international
agreement signed by Ukraine, and it was also the first basic treaty to be
signed by Hungary with a neighboring country in the post-Communist era.
For Ukraine, the particular significance of the treaty was the recognition
therein of the inviolability ofUkraine's borders.
Hungary's Euro-Atlantic integration and its accession to NATO, to the
European Union, and to the Schengen Area have not resulted in greater dis-
tance in the relations between the two countries. Rather, the process has
tended to be accompanied by a search for solutions. For Hungarian-Ukraini-
an relations, the touchstone has not been Euro-Atlantic integration but rather
changes in Hungarian government policy towards the Hungarian minority
communities outside Hungary.
In its relations with Ukraine, the first Orbán government, which
took office in 1998, linked aU issues to the matter of the Hungarians in
Transcarpathia. Ukraine, however, took the view that this was just one-albeit
important-area of bilateral relations. Locations in Transcarpathia have been
emphatically included among the venues for high-level bilateral meetings,
or such meetings have been linked with events of symbolic significance to
Hungarians in Transcarpathia. A key measure taken by Hungary during the
period was the adoption of the so-called Status Law (2001), which-thanks
to the Basic Treaty-did not cause the diplomatic bilateral complications
that it did in the case of Romania and especially in the case of Slovakia. In
* This study was commissioned and supported by the Budapest-based Tom Lantos
Institute and presented at the workshop "Hungari an Minorities in a European Context:
Achievements and Challenges" (13 July 2014, Budapest, Hungary).
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Ukraine, the legal backdrop to the positive attitude was provided by the Act
on National Minorities (Artic1es 15 and 17), intergovernmental and inter-
agency agreements, and the bilateral joint committees. Ukraine recognized
that it must grant the possibility of contact between the country's minorities
and their kin states in both intergovernmental and private relations. l
Ukraine reacted less favorably to a measure taken by the second Orbán
government, which took office in 2010, namely the amendment of Act LV
of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship. Under the terms of the amendment, as
of January 1,2011, Hungarians living outside Hungary's borders have been
able to acquire Hungarian citizenship in a simplified and preferential proce-
dure. Much misunderstanding arose from the impression given in Hungary's
public discourse and media-which was then repeated abroad-that the legal
act amounted to an "Act on Dual Citizenship," whereas in reality dual or
multiple citizenship was already an accepted legal institution in Hungary.
Artic1e4 of the Ukrainian Constitution states: "There is a single citizen-
ship in Ukraine." The current Act on Citizenship (20 ll) adds the following
explanatory note: "If a citizen of Ukraine becomes a citizen of any other
country or countries, then Ukrainian law shall recognize that person only as
a Ukrainian citizen." Despite differing theoretical interpretations, this means
in practice that as long as the Ukrainian authorities do not encounter public1y
acknowledged instances of dual or multiple citizenship, there is no proce-
dure to detect and establish such a fact. Even so, it is advisable, particularly
in view of the uncertainty of the future, for people to conduct themselves
in accordance with the law and to refrain from public displays of dual or
multiple citizenship, which is seemingly illegitimate under Ukrainian law.
On several occasions in recent years, the issue of sanctioning has been raised
in the Ukrainian Parliament, but to date no concrete decision has been taken.
One might add that this is fortunate because at the moment there is no chance
of legitimizing dual or multiple citizenship, even though the constitutional
experts of the constitutional assembly established during the Yanukovich era
did for the first time (and probably for the last time for a long period) give
serious consideration to this possibility.
The Ukrainian media regularly publishes reports on how both Hungary
and Romania are "hand ing out" passports through their diplomatic missions
on Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainian media treats it as fact that members
of the business elite in Ukraine, as well as many ordinary citizens, possess
second passports, with the latter group being primarily motivated by eco-
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nomic factors. Media reports indicate several hundred thousand people with
dual citizenship, but even this figure accounts for no more than 1 percent
ofUkraine's total population. Importantly, however, most ofthose who are
believed to be affected have links with well-defined regions (e.g., Trans-
carpathia, Bukovina, and Crimea), all of which symbolize, at least from a
Ukrainian perspective, the propensity for "separatism."
Representatives ofUkraine's minorities, including those of the Hungar-
ian, Polish and Romanian minorities, foster close contacts with their kin-
states. On the international stage, however, interest representation is limited
mainly to the Crimean Tatars, and the problems of that particular minority
are the only ones the international organizations are prepared to address in a
senous manner.
For Ukraine's politicai actors, the events of late 2013 and early 2014-
Russia's seizure of Crimea-affirmed the legitimacy of their concerns about
"separatism." Consequently, administrative changes within Ukraine involv-
ing any kind of autonomy are now even less likely than before. The politi-
cization of the issue over a period of two decades or more has resulted in
the conflation of autonomy with secession. It seems that the events of recent
months will conserve this situation. The change in government of February
2014 and the presidential election of May 2014 have clearly demonstrated
that administrative reform can have only one aim: the decentralization of
power by strengthening regional and local governments, but without grant-
ing autonomy (and federalization is also not an option).
In post-independence Ukraine, the idea of autonomy was broached not
only in Crimea, but also in other areas. In the early 1990s, several attempts
were made in this field, rang ing from referendum initiatives to overt separa-
tism. Demands for autonomy were made by the Hungarians and Romanians
in Transcarpathia and the Bulgarians and Gagauz in Odessa Oblast. Mean-
while the Rusyns of Transcarpathia and the Romanians ofBukovina declared
their intention to secede. At the same time, we should not forget the similar
endeavors ofUkrainians and Russians.
At the advent of the 1990s, not even the most committed Ukrainian
patriots believed that Ukraine might become independent, particularly while
retaining the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. At the time, the maximum
politicaI goal was a federative Ukrainian state as part of a confederation
of the Soviet republics. One actor in such a process of internal federaliza-
tion would have been the Galician Association, which covered the western
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Ukrainian oblasts, including Transcarpathia. However, circumstances III
the aftermath of the failed Soviet coup of August 1991 presented an op-
portunity for Ukraine's full independence.' During subsequent planning
for public administrative reforms, the possibility of merging four oblasts-
Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil and Transcarpathia-into a single ob1astwas
raised but then dismissed. Opposition to this idea was particularly strong in
Transcarpathia.
In addition to Crimea, "Russian separatism" also led to conflict situa-
tions in the eastern and southeastern oblasts on two occasions. At the time
of the Orange Revolution in late 2004, a series of eastern and southeastern
oblasts declared their separate regional status, and the idea of establishing
an Autonomous Republic of Southeastern Ukraine was also raised. In 2014,
conflicts arose in roughly the same parts of the country. Indeed, for several
months now the Ukrainian Army has been waging an armed struggle in the
Dombas region to prevent the formation of secessionist republics in Luhansk
and Donetsk oblasts, thereby further destabilizing the situation in Ukraine.
In view of this context, it is worth examining the situation in
Transcarpathia and the issue of Hungarian autonomy. Although Ukraine
declared its independence on August 24, 1991, the country received
international recognition only after the decisionwas confirmed in areferendum
held on December 1, 1991. On the day of the national referendum, two
local referendums were also held in Transcarpathia. At the initiative of the
district council of Berehove, the district's inhabitants were asked to vote for
or against the transformation of the district into "a Hungarian autonomous
area." With a voter participation rate of 8l.5 percent, 8l.4 percent voted in
favor of this change. Meanwhile, at the initiative of the oblast council, the
oblast's inhabitants were asked to vote on a "special self-governing status"
for the oblast: with a voter participation rate of 82.7 percent, 78 percent
voted in favor. In Kyiv, neither of these initiatives found support; indeed,
the referendums were dismissed as mere public opinion surveys of no
consequence. Some experts argued that the absence of the term "autonomy"
from the referendum question on the status ofthe oblast meant that the local
referendum had mere ly confirmed the status of Transcarpathia as a separate
oblast within Ukraine, that is, as an entity that could not be merged with other
administrative units. The two issues, the status of the district of Berehove
and the status of the oblast, were on the local/regional agenda for some time,
but they gradually became confined to the theoretical level.'
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Almost concurrently with these referendums, the issue of Hungarian
autonomy in Transcarpathia became an issue for Hungary with the signing
of the Hungarian-Ukrainian Basic Treaty in December 1991. As early as
August 1990, Hungarian Prime Minister József Antall told the Ukrainian
foreign minister Anatoliy Zlenko, who was on a visit to Budapest, that while
Hungary respected European borders, it also wished to see the granting of re-
gional autonomy to Transcarpathia." The basic treaty formulated guarantees
for ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia, but it did not mention the issue of
autonomy. This omission led to adornestic politicai crisis in Hungary when
several members of the govern ing party, the Hungarian Demoeratic Forum,
rejected the terms of the basic treaty and formed the Hungarian Justice and
Life Party. As Zsolt Németh, Fidesz's foreign policy expert, later pointed
out, "It was through the rejection [of the treaty] that the Hungarian far right
carne into being".' Though still disputed, the archival evidence shows that
the Hungarian government involved the Cultural Alliance of Hungarians in
Transcarpathia (still united at the time) in preparations for the basic treaty."
After the Cultural Alliance (est. 1989) split into two parts, the issue of
autonomy also divided the Hungarians in Ukraine. The Cultural Alliance
became committed to the idea of establishing a district along the Tisza River
comprising mostly Hungarian-inhabited towns and villages. This idea be-
carne a topic of debate in the 1999 and 2004 Ukrainian presidential election
campaigns. As an important aside to this issue, it is worth mentioning that
the 15th Session of the Hungarian-Ukrainian Intergovernmental Joint Com-
mittee on the Rights of the National Minorities, held in Budapest on Decem-
ber 19,2011, ended with an unsigned protocol. This was an unprecedented
development in the history of the Joint Committee, which was established on
the basis of a declaration on the rights of the national minorities, signed by
the ministers for foreign affairs of Hungary and Ukraine on May 31, 1991.
The two sides declined to sign the draft protocol after both of them made
proposals whose inclusion in the protocol was rejected by the other side. The
Ukrainian side insisted that the protocol should contain the following: the
parties will consult without delay "on the situation that has arisen in Ukraine
in consequence of the implementation of the citizenship law amended by
Hungary in 2010." For its part, the Hungarian side urged the inclusion in the
protocol of a proposal made by the Cultural Alliance ofHungariaIis in Tran-
scarpathia regarding the establishment of a district alongside the Tisza River.
Here, it is worth recalling that the protocol of the 10th Session of the Joint
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Committee (held in 2001) included the following sentence: "The Ukrainian
side shall examine and support, on the basis of the initiative of the Cultural
Alliance ofHungarians in Transcarpathia, the proposal for the establishment
of a district alongside the Tisza River".'
Meanwhile, the Hungarian Demoeratic Alliance in Ukraine, forrned
in the early 1990s from a splinter group that left the Cultural Alliance of
Hungarians in Transcarpathia, saw a realistic chance of realizing autonomy
by utilizing and developing the opportunities inherent in Ukraine's system of
local government. The Hungarian Self-Governance Forum in Transcarpathia,
in operation since 1994, and its successor from 2000, the Association of
Border Region Self-Governments in Transcarpathia, have been variously
active over the years and have cooperated with the Alliance of Hungarian
Self-Governments, the Association of Hungarian Mayors and the organiza-
tions of the other local minorities.
In 2014, Ukraine's several conflict zones, alI linked with "separatism"
but not of a comparable scale, were as folIows: Crimea, eastern-southeastern
Ukraine, and, in a very limited form, Transcarpathia. The inclusion of Tran-
scarpathia on the "map of conflicts" occurred in the context of the signing of
a treaty between Hungary and Russia on the expansion of the Paks nuclear
power plant and in connection with statements made by the Hungarian po-
litical party Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary on Transcarpathia, a
further statement made by a Jobbik representative legitimizing the Crimean
Referendum held on March 16, 2014, and statements made at the end of
March by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, deputy speaker of the Russian Duma, call-
ing for break-up ofUkraine-all of which repeatedly stirred up the debate in
the media and led to reactions in the broader politicai sphere. The Ukrainian-
language press was the scene of much of the media debate. The Hungarian-
language media outlets have latent or mani fest links with one or other of
the Hungarian community organizations and generally provide reports and
commentary on disagreements between these organizations, on the policies
of Hungarian governments towards the Hungarian minorities abroad, and
on public indignation concerning the "anti-Hungari an stance" taken by the
Ukrainian press.
A special feature of the European Parliamentary elections of May 2014
from a Hungarian perspective was the inclusion of representatives of the
Hungarian communities abroad on the Fidesz-Christian Demoeratic Peo-
ple's Party joint list. Among these representatives from outside Hungary, we
find a candidate from Transcarpathia and a candidate from Slovakia. Yet in
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both these countries "dual citizenship" is not permitted. The candidate from
Slovakia received only a symbolic place on the list, but the candidate from
Transcarpathia-Andrea Bocskor, history lecturer and institute director at the
Ferenc Rákóczi II. Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute (which has close
connections with the Cultural Alliance of Hungarians in Transcarpathia)-
was placed higher on the list and succeeded in winning a seat in the Euro-
pean Parliament. The public was not told, either before or after the elect-
ion, how or why Bocskor was selected as candidate. Bocskor, who lacks
experience in politics and public life, stated the following in the run-up to
the election: "1 consider it my important task to promote the realization of
Ukraine's European integration and to make the situation and efforts of the
Transcarpathian Hungarian community visible in the Brussels aréna"." The
Cultural Alliance of Hungarians in Transcarpathia stated the following: "In
the current difficult situation in Ukraine, it is extremely important that the
matters and endeavors of the Hungarian community should be made visible
to Europe's politicians, that these politicians should know about the Hungar-
ians in Transcarpathia and learn of their endeavors and their problems".?
The representation of Transcarpathia in Brussels was also welcomed by the
Hungarian Demoeratic Alliance in Transcarpathia. In the wake of the do-
mestic politicai revolution in Ukraine in February 2014 and despite the fact
that Bocskor has publicly acknowledged her dual citizenship, even the most
radical nationalist politicai forces have so far refrained from raising the issue
of revoking her Ukrainian nationality.
It is a fact that Hungarians are far more "visible" in Ukraine than one
might infer from their population share. The attitude of intellectuals in the
Hungarian community, which is based on the strong representation of politi-
cai interests and an enhanced role in public life, gives rise to many confiicts
ev en within the community. Even so, a general and constant feature is a de-
sire to balance national (ethnic) identity with citizenship loyalty.
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ABSTRAKT
(Fedinec, Tschilla)
Einige Aspekte der Ungarisch-Ukrainischen Beziehungen
in Unserer Zeit
Die Position der Ungam in der Ukraine kann mit dem Begriff des Ethno-
Regionalismus charakterisiert werden. Darunter versteht man einerseits eine
politische Bewegung, deren Ziel die Starkung der in dieser Region lebenden
ethnischen Gemeinschaften beziehungsweise die Erreichung einerdominanten
Position für sie ist; andererseits steht der Begrifffür die Gesamtheit politischer
Ansichten mit bestimmen Zielsetzungen (gebietsgebundene Ethnopolitik;
Institutionalisierung ethnischer Zugehörigkeit). Die Studie analysiert einige
Aspekte ungarisch-ukrainisch Verhaltnis.
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